

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM

JAN 29 1953

To: David Danzig

January 29, 1953

From: Marc Vosk *MV*

Subject: Proposal for national poll. (Revised)

1. January 20, 1953 saw the installation for the first time in twenty years of a Republican administration in Washington. Most political commentators agree that this event presages important changes in American policy orientation here and abroad during the next four or more years. The nature of these changes and their effect upon the position of Jews in the United States are matters of vital concern to the American Jewish Committee.

2. In a number of problem areas with which the American Jewish Committee is concerned, we had reached a "stock taking" point even before the outcome of the election was known. The Staff Policy Committee has had before it many problems relating to the political future and its effect upon Jews in the United States, Church-State, Communism and war, Civil rights and Civil liberties, and others of like moment. Many of its deliberations have been hampered by the lack of relevant and necessary facts. The kinds of information needed varied all the way from historical background fill-ins, to knowledge of how the American public felt about such specific issues as released time.

Here, we are concerned with one phase of the total picture, that is with national public opinion and attitudes towards these problems. It should be clearly understood that the data which polls of this kind can provide do not exhaust the kinds of information required for policy formulation. Other studies, historical, sociological and psychological may be required to complete the guide needed for effective programming. Listed below are a number of questions to which we have no definite answers. We have selected only a few of the numerous problems which have concerned us. Immediacy and urgency have been the principles governing this selection:

I. Jews and Communism

1. Have recent events brought about any increasing association in the public mind of Jews with Communism or espionage (it should be remembered that our previous poll, in 1951, showed very little association of this kind.) Has the Rosenberg case and the attendant publicity given to the clemency drive had any effect on attitudes towards Jews?

2. What are the effects, if any, of our campaign to bring before the American public the facts about anti-Semitism in Eastern European countries? Does the knowledge that Jews are on the side of Western democracy and oppose Communist regimes, improve the general feeling towards them on the part of the American public? That is, are Jews now regarded as "on our side?" Or, will the campaign reinforce popularly held stereotypes of the Jew as alien, internationalist, communist, untrustworthy? Revive accusation of Jews "getting others to pull their chestnuts out of fires"? As warmongers? Interested only in their own people?

II. Civil Rights

Another area not unrelated to the problems of Jews and communism, with which we have been seriously concerned is that of Civil rights and Civil liberties. It appears reasonable to suppose that our programming could be helped by answers to the following questions among others:

1. To what extent do the American people feel that problems of security justify the limitation or denial of Civil rights or liberties to certain groups in the population? What safeguards against violation of citizen rights are seen as needed.
2. Should security checks and loyalty investigations be extended to other fields? Are there fields where such checks are not necessary? In government? Industry? The entertainment field?

III. CHURCH-STATE

Another field that we are concerned with and which appears to be acquiring increasing importance in our programming is church-state. We have for sometime wanted to know:

1. Have there been any changes in traditional American opposition to church influence in public affairs? Are such changes related to a hypothetical "trend towards religiosity" (a recent study at Northwestern University found that there was a measurable increase in the belief in the "reality of God" during the period 1933-1949).
2. More specifically, is the American public sold on released or dismissed time for school children? Do the people support government aid to parochial institutions, education, welfare, etc.? Is Jewish opposition to released time regarded unfavorably?
3. To what extent have institutional and other attacks upon the public educational system as "secular and Godless" taken hold? Is there any opposition, and how great is it, to the introduction of religion in the public schools; to bible reading, prayer, etc.?

Finally, insofar as Jews in particular are concerned, we want to know:

1. Has there been any change in the degree or pattern of anti-Jewish feeling in the United States since our last poll in 1950? Are these changes in any way related to national or international developments?
2. Do the American people expect or want any change in policy ~~as~~ toward minority groups on the part of the present administration? Do they feel that the government has gone far enough in "appeasing" minority groups with FEP legislation?
3. Has the tendency sometimes manifested to scapegoat Jews for national ills remained unchanged? Are Jews for example, blamed for increasing friction between Catholics and Protestants? Are Jews "responsible" for our international complications? Are they in fact "leading us into another war"?
4. If the present election represented a trend towards isolationism, and opposition to the "useless war" in Korea, does this sentiment represent an increasing degree of nationalism in the American people? (extremes of nationalism have always been associated with anti-minority feeling).

The above questions and many others of the like import seem to have critical importance in the shaping of our educational campaign during the next year or two. The answers we obtain should be of help in setting our goals and in establishing "channel markers" for future activities.

I would propose therefore, that the Department of Scientific Research undertake a national poll in the immediate future which would get us information of this nature. Financing the poll would require approximately \$10,000 (exclusive of staff time). This estimate is based on the costs of our last national poll on Communism.

Alternately, we can confine ourselves to a few questions only, those regarded as most pressing at the moment. Such a course would materially lower the cost of the poll while at the same time reducing the amount of information at our disposal.

mv:mr

cc: Dr. John Slawson

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

M E M O R A N D U M

July 8, 1954

To: Area Directors

From: Manheim Shapiro

Subject: Nationwide Poll - 1953

Attached is a confidential summary of some of the findings in the poll conducted by us in July 1953. The attached section deals with a comparison of the responses of Jewish and Negro interviewees. You will note that the reports in this summary are regarded by our Scientific Research department as extremely tentative, since only a very small sampling was included.

This summary is being sent to you only for your information. You should not at this time transmit either a copy of the document itself or any of the information in the document to anybody.

MSS:em

(30)

NATIONWIDE POLL, 1953
JEWISH & NEGRO INTERVIEWS

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this report on our July 1953 poll, we compare the replies of Jewish and Negro respondents with those of white Protestant and Catholic groups. We have had considerable hesitancy about making such comparisons because of the small samples upon which they are based. Only 57 Jews and 114 Negroes were interviewed, reflecting the relative proportions of these groups in the general population (our total national cross-section included 1,291 cases). Percentages obtained for samples of this size are not as accurate as we might wish. Nonetheless, some of the results obtained reflect true differences between the various populations. In other cases the proportions of Jews and white Christians answering similarly are so nearly identical, that we are fairly safe in assuming that their attitudes towards the problems under consideration agree quite closely.

DANGERS FACING THE UNITED STATES

Our first question was concerned with public estimates of the greatest dangers facing the United States at the present time. The answers to this question are given in Table I. In general, Jews, like white Christians, saw Russia, the cold war and the Korean War as the principal dangers facing America. Negroes were more often occupied with the actual Korean War than with the threat of Russia and the cold war. The atom bomb concerned Jews somewhat more than it did other white Americans, Negroes somewhat less.

Understandably, economic conditions were of greater moment to Negroes than they were to Jews, who if anything, were less disturbed by such problems than was the rest of the population. United States Communists and subversives were less frequently mentioned by both Jews and Negroes than by white Christians.

There are only slight differences between Jews and other whites on the subsidiary question we asked about the extent to which they "worried" about the problem. Negroes on the other hand appear to "worry" more than whites. Thus, 27% of Jews "worried a great deal" and 61% "worried some" about the problems they listed in reply to our first question. These percentages compare with 24% and 57% respectively among white Christian respondents and 48% and 40% respectively among Negroes. Only 12 percent of those Jews and Negroes whom we questioned answered, "don't worry at all" as against 19% of white Christians who replied similarly.

UNTRUSTWORTHY GROUPS

Our next question dealt with the "trustworthiness" of specific groups of Americans. Both Jews and Negroes were slightly more trusting of "other groups" than were white Christians. This is clearly shown in Table II.

However, Jews named Communists and subversives among untrustworthy groups somewhat more frequently than did white Protestant Americans. This, despite the fact that they had not mentioned Communists and subversives as frequently in reply to our first question. (See Table I.) Negroes were much less bothered by Communists as a potential threat but were considerably more disturbed by "foreigners and other nationality groups." Jews too come in for their share of mistrust on the part of Negroes. Eight percent of those Negroes who said "you can't trust some" named Jews as one of their targets for suspicion.

AMERICAN COMMUNISTS

Fewer Jews than other white Americans were inclined to regard American Communists as "a great danger" (Table III.), while a larger proportion saw them as "somewhat dangerous." However, when these two "estimates" of the extent of the danger are combined, the difference between Jews and the rest of the population becomes small. 79% of white Christians and 75% of Jewish respondents thought Communists to be either a "great" or "some" danger. Negroes more frequently said "Communists are practically no danger." The three principal reasons given by those who saw Communists as "a danger" are the same. They are, "they spy, or carry on sabotage; they influence people; they are against us."

The question of what to do about Communists (Table IV.) elicited generally similar replies from all groups. The severest measures, including deportation and jail, were mentioned by about equal proportions in all white groups although Catholics were somewhat more inclined to drastic action and Negroes somewhat less. Investigation and watching was a frequently cited remedy. Both Jews and Negroes, more often than other groups, registered their opposition to any action at all. 18% in each group, as compared with 12% of the white Christian population, replied "do nothing." Asked which groups or kinds of people in the U. S. were more likely to be Communists, all of our respondents replied in largely similar vein. In view of the smallness of the samples involved the differences among them should not be over-interpreted. Nevertheless, it is of some interest that none of our Jewish respondents spontaneously named "Jews" as "more likely than others to be Communists." (Table V.) When presented with a card on which Jews were specifically mentioned, only four percent picked them as "more likely." This figure should be compared with nine percent of white Christian,

and five percent among Negro respondents who singled out Jews when shown the same list.

INVESTIGATING COMMITTEES

From polls taken by other organizations we already know that a great many Jews have been critical of McCarthy's investigating techniques. Our own questions, taken before the current hearings, furnish additional evidence along the same lines. We asked whether our respondents felt Congressional investigating committees did more good than harm or more harm than good. The replies clearly show that both Jews and Negroes regarded these committees with less favor than did white Christians. Compared to 64% of white Christians who replied "more good than harm", and only 16% who said, "more harm than good", Jewish replies divided almost equally. 40% said "more good", 39% "more harm." Among Negroes 38% found more "good" and 25% more "harm" in committee activities. "Don't know" totaled about 20% for all white groups and 37% among Negroes.

ETHNOCENTRISM

Several of our questions were designed to get at ethnocentrism in general. Jews, as we expected, turned out to be less willing to express such sentiments than any of the other groups in the population. This is clearly shown in Table VI. It is interesting to note that only Catholics were specifically named by Jews as a "threat" to this country. But even this group is mentioned less frequently by Jews than by Protestant respondents. Jewish estimates of general anti-Catholic feeling, another indicator of intergroup hostility, are likewise less than similar estimates by other groups in the population. (Table VII.)

On the other hand, Jews appear to be far more sensitive to, or aware of, criticism of themselves than any other group. Two out of five Jews report having heard criticism of their own group. (Table VIII.) This is about twice as large a proportion as we found among other groups in the population. Some indication of the excessive nature of this sensitivity is given by comparing Jewish replies to this question, with Catholic replies to a previous question regarding anti-Catholicism. (Table VII.) Catholic respondents, when asked whether anti-Catholic feeling was increasing, replied in the affirmative less frequently than did white Protestants, or for that matter than did Negroes. Moreover, more Catholics than any other group thought that anti-Catholic feeling was "decreasing." Jews on the other hand, as we have already seen, regard their own situation in America more pessimistically than do other groups in the population. It is interesting to compare the kinds of criticism heard by different groups in the population. Both Jews and Catholics mention the "spy, traitor, Rosenberg" constellation more frequently than do either white Protestants or Negroes, both of which groups give the "unscrupulous businessmen" and "too much business power" stereotypes top places on their lists. The detailed "charges" mentioned by each group are shown in Table IX.

JEWS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Our next question dealt with opinions about the treatment of Jews in Communist countries. The answers of Jewish respondents reflect principally their estimates of the extent of anti-Semitic activities in these countries. However, they may also be regarded as indicative of the same "sensitivity" to Jewish problems, which was evidenced in the questions about criticism of Jews. More than half of our Jewish respondents thought Jews fared

"worse" than other groups while not one Jewish respondent replied that Jews were treated "better" in Russia. It is interesting to note that a considerable proportion of Jews think the cause of their plight is the fact that "Jews are religious and believe in God." Of some significance too is the fact that the reason "they like freedom, oppose regime" is given twice as frequently by Jews as by other respondents. (Tables X and XI.)

SUMMARY

In most respects Jewish opinion on questions of national interest does not differ markedly from the attitudes of white Christians. Jews see much the same dangers facing America as do other Americans. Insofar as their attitudes towards Communism are concerned, they are somewhat less inclined to view the danger to America from this source as "great", but at the same time show a slightly greater tendency to regard Communists as untrustworthy. They advocate much the same measures for dealing with Communism as do other Americans although they look with less favor upon Congressional investigation committees. Moreover, they estimate the position of Jews in Communist countries to be worse, than do other whites. As regards specifically Jewish problems, Jews show greater sensitivity to, or more awareness of "criticism," particularly of the "spies or traitors" allegation, than any other group in the population.

Negro opinion deviates more from that of white groups, Gentile or Jewish, than these differ among themselves. Negroes show more frequent concern with immediately personal problems, the Korean War and economic conditions, than with Russia, the cold war or U. S. Communism. Their estimate of the danger to America from Communism is lower than that of

any other group, the remedies they propose are milder, they look upon Congressional investigating committees with less favor. They show greater inclination to regard "nationality groups" with suspicion than do white Gentiles, but the differences are not too significant. As is often the case with lower income groups, the proportion of "don't know" replies is higher among Negroes than among other groups.

Finally, we must again underline the small number of interviews on which this report is based and once more emphasize the need for another and much enlarged sampling of Jewish opinion if we are to arrive at a more accurate and objective comparison of Jewish and Gentile attitudes towards public questions.

APPENDIX

TABLE I

"What do you think are the greatest dangers facing the United States at the present time?"

	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Negroes</u>
Russia, cold war	28%	28%	28%	11%
Korean war, threat of war	42	47	47	54
Economic conditions, future	16	15	14	26
Atom bomb	10	17	21	8
U.S. Communism, subversives	11	8	5	2
Moral, character weakness	9	3	2	6
Politics, corruption	5	4	5	--
Disasters	5	4	2	7
Other, misc.	15	6	16	18
Don't know, none	5	6	7	13

TABLE II

"In time of danger to America, would you say we can count on all Americans, or are there some groups that cannot be trusted as much as others?"

	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Negroes</u>
Can count on all groups	30%	36%	37%	42%
Can't trust some	66	58	61	46
Don't know	4	6	2	12

(IF "Can't trust some"): "Which groups do you think we could not trust?"

	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Negroes</u>
Communists, subversives	58%	62%	62%	19%
Labor unions, labor groups	5	5	—	6
Pacifists	5	4	—	—
Jews	1	—	—	8
Foreigners, nationality groups	11	10	3	31
Others, misc.	17	11	—	19
Some in all groups	8	10	15	19
Don't know	14	13	20	21

TABLE III

"At present, how great a danger do you feel American Communists are to this country - a great danger, some danger but not too great, or practically no danger?"

	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Negroes</u>
Great danger	36%	33%	21%	25%
Some danger but not great	43	46	54	25
Practically no danger	17	17	23	27
Don't know	4	4	2	23

TABLE IV

"Do you think anything should be done about American Communists at the present time? If yes, what do you think should be done about them?"

	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Negroes</u>
Investigate, watch them	24%	21%	15%	13%
Enforce law, convict them	11	7	9	3
Deport, jail, execute them	26	35	27	20
Restrict them	8	8	11	5
Continue present measures	10	8	11	--
Other, misc.	6	3	4	6
Do something, don't know what	10	11	9	9
Do nothing, leave them alone	12	13	16	18
Don't know	8	7	8	30

TABIE V

"Can you think of any kinds or groups of people in the United States who are more likely than others to be Communists? If yes, which?"

	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Negroes</u>
Foreigners, aliens	9%	4%	5%	11%
Negroes	5	2	7	4
Misc. nationality groups	5	3	4	4
Jews	2	3	--	4
Poor people	10	8	11	4
Labor, union people	7	3	4	1
Ignorant, uneducated	4	4	2	1
Intellectuals, educated	6	5	9	3
Other, misc.	13	10	15	10
None, don't know	55	72	63	72

TABIE VI

"In your opinion, are there any nationality, religious or racial groups in this country that are a threat to America? If yes, which?"

	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Negroes</u>
Catholics	6%	--%	2%	1%
Jews	3	1	--	2
Jehovah's Witnesses, pacifists	3	1	--	--
Negroes	5	1	--	--
Communists, sympathizers	3	2	--	1
Russians	2	2	--	3
Foreigners, foreign-born	1	--	--	5
Other, misc.	7	4	2	3
None, don't know	77	89	96	39

TABIE VII

"Do you think the feeling against Catholics is increasing or decreasing in this country?"

	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Negroes</u>
Increasing	21%	15%	6%	20%
Decreasing	36	37	30	32
About the same	26	32	28	36
Don't know	17	16	28	31

TABIE VIII

"Have you heard any criticism or talk against the Jews in the last six months?"

	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Negroes</u>
Have heard criticism	20%	21%	39%	15%
Heard no criticism	80	79	61	85

TABIE IX

(IF "Yes"): "What kind of criticism was it?"

	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Negroes</u>
Too much business power	20%	24%	5%	24%
Too much political power	5	6	9	--
Unscrupulous businessmen	21	21	4	18
Rich, shrewd, miserly	8	8	--	--
Spies, traitors, Rosenbergs	14	30	27	12
Communists, radicals	8	3	9	--
Undesirable socially	5	10	--	--
Clannish, stick together	3	6	--	6
Misc.	5	--	--	12
Don't know, usual thing	22	14	54	19

TABLE X

"Speaking of Russia and other Communist countries in Europe - is it your impression that Jews as a group are treated better than other people in those countries, or are they treated worse than other people over there, or about the same?"

	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Negroes</u>
Better	2%	3%	--%	--%
Worse	49	36	52	22
Same	28	38	33	39
Don't know	21	23	15	39

TABLE XI

(IF "Worse"): "Why?"

	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Negroes</u>
Businessmen, capitalists	25%	19%	18%	21%
Like freedom, oppose regime	6	8	14	8
Minority group, don't assimilate	7	11	--	17
Religious, believe in God	16	10	29	--
Same as anywhere else	26	21	32	12
Russia anti-Semitic like Nazis	6	4	4	4
Misc.	4	5	11	4
Don't know	24	37	25	54

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
DEPARTMENT OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

ASSESSING TECHNIQUES FOR CHANGE:

Mass Media, Group Process and Intergroup Contact

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December 30, 1953

ASSESSING TECHNIQUES FOR CHANGE*

BY

MARC VOSSK

INTRODUCTION

The basic question with which we are all concerned is that of change - change in opinion, in attitude, in individual behavior, in group behavior. There is thus, to my mind at least, one essential difference between our problem and those which usually confront the educator or teacher. Ours is the task of persuasion, of changing or overlaying, so to speak, a previously structured pattern of response. Those whom we wish to persuade do not come to us "to learn" (I am not now speaking of training workshops or associations of like-minded people). They have no wish to acquire new skills or new knowledge and certainly evince no desire to change their attitudes. In most cases they do not come to us at all, it is we who must approach them, establish communication with them - through mass media or other means at our disposal.

When it comes to intergroup relations, such people often hold opinions and attitudes, perhaps behave towards their neighbors in ways which most of us would consider undemocratic and tension-producing. Our problem then is to eliminate these old ways of response to intergroup contact and to substitute new forms, which to the best of our knowledge make for harmonious living. In some respects (the analogy will be familiar to those of you who use tape recorders), it resembles erasing an old sound track on a tape before substituting a new recording.

One additional remark by way of introduction - this morning, we are to examine the assumptions made in everyday intergroup relations work and evaluate

* Paper given at the Second Conference on Research in Intergroup Relations of the National Association of Intergroup Relations Officials, December 30, 1953.

the techniques of action used, in terms of existing research. Actually, the apparent dichotomy between assumptions and research is not so rigid as some would suppose. Ideally, today's findings should be tomorrow's assumptions. In practice there is sometimes a time lag to be taken into account. Often too, there is a problem in effective communication and persuasion. Practitioners or, for that matter, social scientists are not always more willing to give up long cherished forms of behavior than are the people they are themselves trying to influence. But, time lag, resistance and all, research does influence assumptions and some of the findings I mention have already acquired the status of "assumptions".

THE MASS MEDIA

Suppose then we consider some of the assumptions made - both explicit and implicit - when the mass media are used to communicate with the people we wish to influence.

The most obvious one is that mass media "reach" masses and hence, that a communication whatever it be, is heard, viewed or read by great numbers of people, many times the number who could be reached by face-to-face contact. This assumption has its foundation in some well-known facts. The daily newspapers of our country reach nine out of ten adults in the population, the radio an even higher proportion. Comic books, alternately the bane and the boon of parents, are read (if that is what one does to comic books) by nine out of ten children. A single issue of LIFE magazine reaches more than a fifth of the adult population of the United States. Within the space of six weeks, some sixty million Americans see at least one issue of this magazine. Leading radio programs, Jack Benny or Amos and Andy, are heard by audiences of 17 or 18 million listeners, while the more popular TV programs such as the Colgate Comedy Hour or "Your Show of Shows" are seen by even greater numbers;

a recent count (1) put the number at 28 million.

Potentially, the audience indeed appears to be enormous. However this optimistic appraisal needs some qualification. To begin with, research has shown that the potential audience for any message is reduced by a process of self-selection. By and large, people view, listen to, or read the kinds of propaganda to which they are favorably disposed beforehand.

People with convictions on any subject, political or social, tend to read the periodicals which reflect their views. Lazarsfeld (2) reports that when a magazine or radio program carries a program setting forth the virtues of a minority group a large proportion of the audience consists of the minority which is being praised. The intended targets of the message are usually conspicuous by their absence.

There is moreover a certain overlap in audiences. People who have read a book tend to go to see the movie made from it. People who read serious literature listen to serious radio programs, those who go in for lighter fiction pick soap opera on radio or TV. Then there is the simple fact of prominence of display, which can insure the fact that a message will be seen, or heard. Generally speaking, the content of intergroup relations communications, even when prepared by experts, precludes their being featured in newspapers. On radio or television, the demands of commerce and audience appeal reserve the favored listening times for more entertaining programs than ours.

In effect the peak audiences reached by the media to which the term mass applies, are attained only by specially popular programs or favored portions of newspapers. For other communications, the "masses" are considerably reduced in number.

A second and easily understandable assumption sometimes made in the use of mass media is that communications on these media can and do reduce prejudice or discrimination or both. In other words, such communications can bring about

changes in individual or group behavior in the area of intergroup relations. Put so broadly the assumption almost begs for a negative answer. Enough is known about the deep-seated nature of prejudice to seriously question the intended effect of mass media communication. Flowerman (3) and others have discussed some of the factors which reduce the effectiveness of mass propaganda against bigotry, such as lack of control of the media, the prevalence of anti-democratic propaganda, selective listening, the nature of the issues involved and others. Yet, despite the operation of these factors it would be idle to deny that mass media do have some effect upon public opinion and attitudes. The real question is what effect, upon whom and under what conditions? Berelson's (4) restatement of the broad assumption of communication effect: "Some kinds of communication on some kinds of issues, brought to the attention of some kinds of people under some kinds of conditions, have some kind of effect", suggests one kind of reformulation which would facilitate application of pertinent research findings.

Numerous earlier studies of propaganda pieces were concerned with the character of the specific message itself, its comprehensibility and the measure of success it had in swaying its audience. Preoccupation with the varying degrees of effect achieved by the same or similar messages on different media is also manifest in many of these investigations. Movies, magazine and newspaper articles, cartoons, radio programs, car cards, have all come in for their share of study. As a result of these separate investigations - many of which are undoubtedly familiar to you - a number of general principles have been enunciated which have had their effect not only upon the nature of propaganda output itself, but on the course of subsequent experimental study of the mass media. In more recent years, researchers have taken greater experimental notice of those situational and social factors within which the process of communication occurs.

It had for long been a matter of common experience that the conditions under which a message is heard or seen had a good deal to do with its effect. Somehow, though, this theoretical and practical knowledge had become obscured, partly by the day-to-day necessity of evaluation of particular pieces of propaganda. But the evaluation process itself only underlined once again the importance of more basic elements in the communication process. Take the example of a study made by our department some years ago of a propaganda film produced during the war by the Army Signal Corps (5). The film pictures a young American stopping to listen to a street-corner demagogue attacking minority groups. Only when the speaker attacks the hero's own "minority" group, "the Masons", does he register dismay. A refugee professor, also present, then paints for our hero in a series of flashbacks to Germany the deadly parallel between Hitler's rise to power and the agitator's harangue.

Our study was designed to determine the effectiveness of the film. In the course of this evaluation a number of important generalizable findings emerged. Among them, the influence of selective perception stands out. Messages beamed at particular groups - such as "Catholics are persecuted" - were most successful in reaching Catholics in the audience. The opposite effect, failure to perceive messages not specifically directed to "one's own groups", was also present. Another interesting development was the fact that in an audience climate which favored reception of a particular message, it was apparently harder to change the "deviates". On the surface this finding might appear to be at odds with the well-known influence of group climate upon change in individual members. Actually there was at least one element in the experimental situation which differed from the usual "group" study. The audience was not readily identifiable as a "group". Deviant individuals may well have been members of groups to which they owed allegiance. But these were groups other than the immediate viewing audience, and undoubtedly had set norms of their own which supported the resistance of our deviants.

There have been many "effects" studies of particular propaganda pieces which shed additional light on more general problems of communication. Since our time limits make it impossible to go into detail, let me attempt instead to summarize for you some of the major findings which bear upon the assumptions we make:

1. People whose attitudes are initially more favorable to a message are more likely to retain its content than those whose initial attitudes are unfavorable. A recent study of the impact of anti-discrimination car cards for example (6) demonstrated that the "tolerant" more frequently recalled the messages than the "prejudiced", and what is more important, more often attributed moral authority to them. However, the so-called " sleeper effect " demonstrated by Hovland and his associates (7) seems to modify this generalization. Soldiers were shown an orientation film intended to improve their attitudes towards Great Britain. Some who saw the film showed no initial effect, but subsequently changed in a direction favorable to the communication at a later date. This change appears to have occurred most among those who were initially opposed to the films' message.
2. It is probably true that information provided by the mass media serves to reinforce attitudes of people already favorably disposed, and to provide the group sanctions which support the process of change in individuals whose opinions are initially opposed. Proof of this effect is difficult to obtain since measurement of a "social climate" is still in its infancy. Sometimes the evidence cited is a matter of placing a reasonable, even if not completely conclusive, interpretation upon related research findings. In the car card study just mentioned, for example, one in five "tolerant" viewers

and one in eight so-called "straddlers" recalled the cards as carrying the force of moral authority. One could construe this finding as implying, for the former, reinforcement of, and for the latter, group sanction for, anti-discriminatory behavior.

3. There is a tendency on the part of targets of propaganda to evade the message of the propagandist (8), particularly if acceptance of the message makes it necessary for them to identify with an "objectionable" character. Such devices as accepting the particular message but dismissing it as atypical or rejecting it by failure to understand it, by denial of its truth, are often used by the prejudiced to evade the necessity for change. The case of the prejudiced veteran in Bettelheim and Janowitz' study who believed all Jews were cowards is typical. Confronted with the fact that a Jew in his unit had received a Congressional award for bravery, he dismissed the evidence by distorting its meaning: "Oh him, he's kill-crazy."
4. People more readily accept specific than general messages, and more readily accept messages which are targeted at their own group. This has been demonstrated so frequently that it has become almost an axiom of intergroup work.
5. People more readily accept messages coming from prestige figures. Merton's (9) analysis of Kate Smith's famous radio bond sales drive is a case in point. However, this statement too needs some modification. In a recent study at Rutgers University (10), with which our department cooperated, it was found that so-called prestige figures had influence in limited areas. A tolerance message from the President might be deemed appropriate, where a similar statement by a public figure who had no special relationship to intergroup problems, might be dismissed as ridiculous. Similar distinctions,

by the way, are drawn by children among the comic characters they admire. Bugs Bunny, say, could hardly be used to teach forbearance and patience.

6. People listen to, read or view the mass media in differing group situations: TV with the family, comics with other children (some people are children). There is some evidence that the choice of media and of favored prestige figures, and even the interpretation placed upon messages, appears to be affected by this group situation. Differences in reactions to the same communication have been noted between children who relate primarily to their own peer groups and those for whom parents are a reference group. In the Rutgers study cited above, peer-group members used comic-book characters as everyday play activity material, and appeared to judge the media in terms of their use for group life. Non-members of peer-groups used the same animal and human heroes as raw material for phantasy or dreams.
7. A number of largely technical findings which are of some importance to the practitioner have also been made. These are of course familiar to most of you; they include such facts as that repeated presentation is more effective than single exposure, that a combined use of auditory and visual material is superior to either presentation by itself, that the more personal the medium the greater the effect, and others of similar import.

In general, it would appear to be a valid conclusion, that mass media of communication can be effective in public opinion and attitude change. The crucial questions remain - under what conditions and with whom? Some answers are beginning to emerge from the accumulating experimental evidence. We can also safely affirm, I think, that with our limited access to the mass media, their use must be regarded as auxiliary, rather than as a primary means of

effecting change. Used thus, as aids to the more personal methods developed in the field of intergroup relations, they merit the serious attention of both researchers and practitioner.

It is these more personal techniques which we must now examine in the light of research. Our evaluation however will not stress the problems raised by the employment of specific techniques such as role-playing, psychodrama and the like, but rather the assessment of the group process itself as a method of inducing change.

GROUP DYNAMICS

It might be well to pause for a moment before plunging into the group dynamics sea to remind ourselves that the concept of the "group" and some of the related processes described by experimenters are not yet so securely anchored in empirical reality as we might wish them to be. There have been many instances in the history of science, of constructs which were later discarded in favor of simpler explanations of observed phenomena. Heat, for example, was regarded as a substance until molecular motion was discovered.

In defense of his preoccupation with group processes, Kurt Lewin warned social scientists against rigid insistence that the objects which they studied must have spatial existence. This warning appears now to be in need of tempering by equal caution against premature system-building. There is always a possibility that many of the phenomena we now regard as products of an almost magical "group process" may turn out to be as easily understood in terms of ordinary learning theory. Consider for example how, by assuming a "need for acceptance by significant others" in all individuals, the process of group influence upon change, relates to orthodox learning theory. As you know, "needs" are thought of as dynamic forces impelling the individual toward learning.

Let me give one example only. In a recent experiment, Robert Bills (11) found that two groups of students in psychology courses achieved significantly different objective ratings in their course, depending upon whether they agreed or disagreed with the values expressed by the instructor. Here we have a result which is similar to the often-demonstrated influence of acceptance of group values upon individual change, operating on the level of interpersonal relationships and learning problems. That the two situations have elements in common (despite the predominantly factual content of the psychology courses) seems obvious enough. The decision as to which theoretical framework to apply is, it seems to me, still an open question.

However, to turn to our immediate problem. Just how shall we go about assessing the techniques of group dynamics used in the improvement of inter-group relations? Intensive and consistent use of such techniques is today confined largely to the training and re-education of individuals, chiefly teachers but also including others whose jobs or interests involve dealing with people. To a more limited extent, some of the techniques developed, such as group discussion, sociometry, role-playing, psychodrama, and much of the newly-acquired knowledge about group pressures toward conformity, about the role and function of group leaders, about the ways in which group norms are reinforced or changed, are being applied to school, church, Scout, adult-discussion and other groups.

At first sight there would appear to be two major areas in which we need to assess the techniques for change which have developed in the group field. The first is their efficacy in bringing about change in the individual. The second, their use in the field of intergroup relations proper, that is, relations between identifiable groups in our population such as, Jew and Gentile, Negro and white, Catholic and Protestant, Italian and Irish. Actually, since it is the immediate aim of human relations training schools where these techniques

have been applied. to achieve changes in individuals rather than groups, most of the experimental work which exists relates directly to this first problem. Research involving the actual application of group processes to the relations between groups is still comparatively rare. Sherif's (12) recently reported camping study which followed two groups of boys through the processes of group formation, identification and belongingness, the development of group standards and values, and finally the actual experimental incitement of intergroup hostility with its attendant name-calling and stereotyping behavior, is one of the few of its kind. Thrasher's (13) and Whyte's (14) well-known studies of gangs fall into this general area but their applicability to problems of intergroup relations is on the whole tangential rather than direct.

We are consequently limited to assessing the group process insofar as it effects changes in individuals. Presumably these individuals then proceed, in their roles as leaders or members of their own groups, to bring about parallel changes within these groups. This puts before us the task of determining first:

The degree to which group processes can and do effect change in the individual, and secondly,

The extent to which the changed individual retains, utilizes and transmits his acquired skills and attitudes in his "back home" group.

Basic to any evaluation is a knowledge of the objectives and assumptions underlying the process under investigation. Often enough these objectives and assumptions are themselves in need of clarification, "pinning-down" so to speak. Sometimes, the principle value derived from assessment is recognition of just this fact. However, we appear to be in a more fortunate position. In a number of recently published reviews of group training activities, both goals and assumptions have been clearly set forth. Let me list first those

goals which are relevant to our present purpose:

1. To change basic self- and group-regarding attitudes in the direction of greater freedoms, permissiveness, democracy and away from authoritarianism.
2. To provide knowledge of the fundamental concepts of intergroup relations.
3. To develop leaders with greater sensitivities to diverse needs and values of groups and group members, and with competence and technical skills in group techniques and processes.

Underlying the methods used in attaining these objectives are the assumptions which we must attempt to evaluate:

First, that individual changes in attitudes, in behavior, in opinion, in sensitivity to the needs of others, can more effectively be brought about in a group situation, particularly in "highly valued" groups.

Second, that such change can more readily be induced in a group whose atmosphere or climate is democratic rather than authoritarian.

Third, that change is facilitated by active participation of leaders and members in the group process and in group problem-solving.

Fourth, that skills, and even more important, attitudes thus acquired will remain with the individual after he has left the training laboratory.

Fifth, that the trainee will in his turn be able to impart these skills and attitudes to the members of his "back home" group.

The evidence we have in support of these assumptions is of two kinds - experimental, chiefly from outside the training schools and workshops, and the evaluations made by the training centers themselves of their success in achieving their objectives. Let us look at this evidence.

Kurt Lewin's (15) classic experiments on changing food habits during the war are of course familiar to all. Subsequent studies carried out by Radke

and others, also with food habits, all confirmed the superiority of the group decision method over the lecture or individual instruction methods. Not only was the group method superior in inducing change but also in assuring retention of the new habit pattern after it was once formed. Coch and French (16) used the group decision method to induce workers to accept technological changes in factory procedures. Resistance was overcome by group discussion. Newcomb's (17) demonstration of the pressures which the college community norms exerted upon Bennington students, is also often cited in support of group anchorage of attitudes and attitude changes. Marrow and French (18) tell how they succeeded in changing a prevalent industry stereotype against older workers, by involving top executives and later other employees in group fact-finding and discussion procedures. Personal persuasion by experts with special knowledge of the field had previously failed.

Then there are the extensive studies of Stouffer and his associates reported in The American Soldier (19) which offer additional evidence of group influence on attitudes. Among the many examples described in these studies is the finding that green troops or replacements tended to adopt attitudes towards combat and towards non-coms which were characteristic of the veteran units to which they were attached. Moreover, and this is perhaps even more significant, their "morale" also approximated that of their new units.

We know too, that the more highly the individual values the group to which he belongs, or the reference group to which he aspires, the more likely he is to adopt that group's norms, and the more resistant he is to suggestions which run counter to them. Mussen's (20) study of attitudes towards Negroes at an interracial camp showed that those white boys who decreased in prejudice were generally the ones who were well satisfied with camp and their fellow campers. Festinger, Schacter and Back's (21) study of small social groups in a housing project provides additional evidence of the greater influence of highly valued

groups upon attitudes. In those housing units where "group cohesiveness" or attractiveness was high, they found a greater uniformity of opinion on controversial issues among the occupants.

The opposite side of the same coin - that is, resistance to change where group norms are opposed to such change - has also been demonstrated. Kelley and Volkart (22) studied the effect of lectures running counter to accepted Boy Scout attitudes towards woodcraft skills, upon members of several troops. They found that such lectures had a negative, or boomerang, effect among those Scouts who valued their membership in the troop highly.

From experiments dealing with social effects upon perception, there is additional evidence of group influence upon the individual. One of the earliest of these is Sherif's (23) study of the auto-kinetic effect. He found a difference between the way in which his subjects perceived the apparent movement of a stationary point of light against a background of total darkness when alone, and when judgment of the same effect was made in company with others. Asch (24) too experimented with group pressures to induce his subjects to change their judgment of the length of lines. Although he appeared to be successful, in subsequent interviews some of his subjects reported that they had not really changed their judgment, only that they said what they had, to avoid group censure. Bruner and Postman (25) studied children's estimation of the size of coins and found that it varied with their economic status. Poor children judged the coins to be larger than did rich children. They might have used the results to write a nice little moral fable. But, being social scientists, they cited it merely as supportive testimony for social influence on perception. It's one of the sacrifices we all make in the name of science.

Then there is the testimony from the workshops themselves. Dr. Tabak's evaluation of University of Chicago workshops (26) and Leland Bradford's report of six years of progress at Bethel (27) present evidence from follow-

up studies with workshop participants of marked changes in attitudes achieved during workshop sessions. Equally impressive is Riecken's (28) report of significant changes in degree of ethnocentrism and authoritarianism among participants in the Friends' Volunteer Work Camps.

Besides these, there are innumerable studies of more specific influence of factors in the group situation. The effect of participation of group members in decision-making and problem-solving has already been indicated. A related problem is the effect of leadership style and leader participation upon the problem-solving behavior of groups. Lewin, Lippitt and White's (29) distinction between democratic, laissez-faire and autocratic leaders has already become classic. Their findings - that autocratic leaders evoked hostile behavior on the part of group members; that laissez-faire leaders increased friendliness among group members and task dissatisfaction, and that democratic leaders promoted satisfaction with achievement and high integration of groups - have since been confirmed by other researchers. Bovard's (30) finding that members of what he terms "group-centered" groups were more susceptible to opinion change than members of "leader-centered groups" also offers support for some of the assumptions listed previously.

The pressures which a group develops to induce conformity in its members have, understandably enough, intrigued a number of investigators. The small group communications experiments of Festinger and his associates, have provided tangible evidence of the process of influence at work. Extreme deviants from established group norms received many more communications from their fellow participants than did more "normal" group members. Supporting evidence for the effects of group pressure appears in an experiment recounted by Hovland (31). Here, Catholic students who had been put on notice, so to speak, that others in their group were of the same faith, proved more resistant to counter-norm communications than Catholics who believed themselves to be in a mixed faith group.

Other investigators have studied the influence of group climate, of the effect of prior friendships among group members, of cultural differences, of group homogeneity and heterogeneity, and other factors. In general, these studies offer additional proof that mutually shared values, shared activities, greater group cohesiveness, and greater valuation placed upon group belongingness by individual members, make for greater pressures towards conformity to group norms and standards, and by the same token increase the group's influence for change.

We turn now to the fourth and fifth assumptions, which postulate the retention of attitudes and skills and their use in the trainees' home environment. Here, the evidence is more fragmentary and sometimes contradictory, making it difficult to draw evaluative conclusions. Both the Chicago and the Bethel group cite letters received and follow-up questionnaires returned by participants, reporting increased activity and effectiveness of graduates upon their return home. Riecken too gives evidence of the persistence of changes in attitudes and of an increase in human relations activity of former work camp participants. Similar testimony can certainly be furnished by workshop directors in any of the twenty or more states where these institutions operate.

But there is also disheartening evidence of indifference, of relapse into former patterns, even of occasional "boomerang" effects when the returning idealist finds himself at too great odds with his home-town group or his factory associates. It is such evidence that has led human relations workshops to ask that schools, communities and industrial plants send "teams" rather than individuals. It has also led them to attempt various kinds of advance "fortification" of the returnee to prepare him for expected disappointments.

How shall we summarize these findings? Morris Raphael Cohen repeatedly cautioned us against the post hoc fallacy in social science experimentation. Neither temporal succession nor mere correlations establish causal relationships.

"A correlation", he wrote (32) "is an empirical or historical statement that in a certain proportion of instances two elements have occurred simultaneously or successively. A causal relation asserts more than mere past coincidence. It affirms that there is some reason or ground why, whenever the antecedent occurs, the consequence must follow."

Judged by such rigorous standards, a good many of the experiments I have reported and many I could not mention for want of time leave much to be desired. Nevertheless, the accumulated evidence, even if not entirely conclusive, is quite impressive. Group processes do change some people who seem otherwise resistant to change. Democratic leadership and a permissive group climate are more effective in some learning situations, again with some people, than other forms of leadership. This is particularly true of the area of learning with which human relations training is concerned. For some persons, participation in group activity, particularly if the group is one to which a close personal allegiance is felt, seems to promote, even accelerate, change in the direction of better self- and group-regarding ^{ATTITUDES} activities. There seems to be a factor in group living which is almost therapeutic in its ability to increase their sensitivity and susceptibility to change.

A portion of Dorwin Cartwright's (33) summary of the ways in which the group process may be most effectively used as a medium of change is worth repeating here:

1. If the group is to be used effectively as a medium of change, those people who are to be changed and those who are to exert influence for change must have a strong sense of belonging to the same group.

2. The more attractive the group is to its members the greater is the influence that the group can exert on its members.
3. In attempts to change attitudes, values, or behavior, the more relevant they are to the basis of attraction to the group, the greater will be the influence that the group can exert upon them.
4. The greater the prestige of a group member in the eyes of the other members, the greater the influence he can exert.
5. Efforts to change individuals or subparts of a group which, if successful, would have the result of making them deviate from the norms of the group will encounter strong resistance.
6. Strong pressure for changes in the group can be established by creating a shared perception by members of the group for change, thus making the source of pressure for change lie within the group.
7. Information relating to the need for change, plans for change, and consequences of change must be shared by all relevant people in the group.

The fact that these salutary changes do not take place in all individuals under what may appear to be similar conditions should be regarded as a challenge to researchers and practitioners. On the one hand, we should be cautioned against unsupported generalization and exaggerated claims of effectiveness. Take for example, a recently reported study of discussion groups at Bethel. The authors, Gage and Exline (34) started with a hypothesis which seemed to be the logical consequence of current assumptions in the field. It was that accuracy of social perception, or the degree to which "an individual's perception of the characteristics of other individuals or groups are in accord with reality", is related to the individual's effectiveness in discussion groups. This apparently self-evident statement, they were unable to substantiate. Instead they found a number of complex situational variables which made clear

prediction impossible. On the other, it calls for increased and more rigorously controlled experimentation in this field. Obviously we need to know much more than we do now about the ways in which influence is transmitted in groups, more about the optimum conditions for its transmission, more about the kinds of individuals who are or are not influenced to change. These things we can learn, as much by observation as by experiment.

Beyond this, I think that the results already obtained warrant the continuation and the extension of existing uses of the group process in human relations work.

CONTACT AND CHANGE

The third and final method we are to examine this morning is "contact". In this area, as in the others with which we have dealt, there are many theoretical problems which still await solution. Not the least of these is the definition of "contact" itself. Much of the difficulty in assessing the relative weight to be assigned to various studies purporting to prove the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of "contact" lies in this realm of definition. Posing quite a different theoretical problem is the fact that most investigators of intergroup contact have been concerned largely with its effect upon one variable - prejudice or tension. Consequently, avoidance of contact has almost always been construed simply as an act of hostility on the part of the majority group. Very little is known, however, about similar avoidance of contact by minority group members. Here, we are confronted by a totally different set of problems, involving maintenance of individual and group identity. To what extent, for example, does positive contact presuppose acceptance by minority members of majority norms or roles assigned to them by majority stereotypes? Can contact in limited spheres of action provide sufficient basis for increased intergroup understanding? While

these and other such questions are outside the scope of our present discussion, it seems to me that our concern with the general problem of effectiveness must include at least an awareness of those other elements in the intergroup relations picture which need further study.

Contact among groups (personally I prefer the word interaction) is a necessary consequence of the progressive elimination of segregation and discrimination in employment, in education, in housing, in health, and other areas of social living. Regarded in this light, our problem is not to determine whether contact reduces intergroup hostility, but rather how, under what conditions, and in what manner it does so, and where it sometimes seems to fail, to discover and eliminate the conditions which led to failure.

It is of course obvious that intergroup hostilities as well as intergroup harmony must occur at "points of contact" between hostile groups. In general, it is probably true that where the special interests of groups are, or appear to group members to be, in basic conflict, contact alone not only fails to achieve harmony but sometimes has the opposite effect. Ram and Murphy's (35) recently reported investigation of bitterly hostile Moslem and Hindu groups is one of a number of studies which indicate that such contact does little to improve intergroup attitudes. Or, take the case described in Sherif's camping study. Here, after a series of artificially-created hostile incidents, and the "successful" establishment of a tension situation between two groups of boys, further contact between members of the opposing groups only led to overt expression of enmity.

But, while these caveats are necessary, if only to warn against over-optimistic generalizations, there is a mounting body of evidence that under certain conditions contact or interaction can and does lead to better understanding, and is positively related to reduction in prejudice.

Some five years ago, while studying patterns of prejudice in a large Eastern city, we found that there was a measurable relationship between the majority group's prejudice and the extent of its contact with minority groups. Those who reported such contact, especially those who remembered childhood friendships with minority group members, expressed less prejudice than those who did not. This same relationship was confirmed the following year in another city, this time in the Midwest. In a more recent study, still in progress, we seem to be finding the same influence at work within the minority group itself. Teen-agers who neither date members of the majority group nor report frequent close friendship contacts, appear in general to be less favorably disposed to them than those who do go out on mixed dates or report other friendship contacts.

That such facts offer no proof of a causal relationship is of course obvious. Our data do not allow us to determine conclusively which of these variables is cause, which effect, or whether both may be due to a third factor not yet isolated. This situation only points up the ever-present difficulty in social science research of isolating significant variables, not to speak of determining actual cause-and-effect relationships. How, for example, should we understand the Deutsch and Collins (36) finding that white tenants of integrated public housing units show more favorable attitudes towards their Negro neighbors than do the tenants of segregated units? As evidence of the effect of "equal-status" contact? As evidence of the importance of simple propinquity? Or as evidence of the fact that integration provides increased opportunity for shared activities?

There is, however, one conclusion I think we can draw from these studies and it is an important one: that is, contact between groups, per se, neither causes nor promotes intergroup hostility or tension. For if it did, the relationship we found could not have occurred.

That all forms of interaction, under any and all conditions, reduce hostility, no one will assert. Mussen's (37) study of children at an interracial camp, for example, provides evidence that contact alone neither decreases nor increases prejudice towards Negroes. Whether a child reacted positively or negatively to the contact experience seemed to be related to his "susceptibility to change", a personality factor, as well as to whether or not he felt the camp experience to be a rewarding one.

Here, the conditions which favored a positive effect were personality variables and satisfaction with the camp experience. No one will today deny the importance of personality as a factor in prejudice. However, since the overwhelming majority of contact situations outside of training centers do not permit social scientists or practitioners to manipulate "personality" variables, we must, as practitioners, examine other factors which have been found to be associated with "favorable" contact situations. Two such elements are emphasized in recent research evidence. The first is "equal-status" contact; the second, contact accompanied by common activity towards a shared objective.

As to the first of these, "equal-status", it is by no means so easily isolated as might appear. Status is a complex phenomenon in our society, and some of the experimental evidence cited in support of "equal-status" contact is hardly conclusive. As is so often the case with experimental evidence, what is actually demonstrated is the obverse conclusion: that contact among individuals of unequal status, from different groups, sometimes - but not always - results in greater hostility, and often fails to reduce prejudice.

Let me give an example of the complexity of the variables which actually enter a supposedly simple intergroup contact situation. From a pilot study

of a small-town Girl Scout troop, undertaken by our department, which unfortunately was never completed, we gained an interesting insight into one of the conditions of acceptance of a minority group member by her majority group associates. Neither equal status nor shared activity seemed to be crucial, although both were present - but rather, the cheerful enactment by the Negro Girl Scout, of the role which the "normal" majority stereotype assigned to her: tidying up after the meeting and other similar duties. Such conditional acceptance could hardly be regarded as evidence of the influence of either equal status or shared activity. On the contrary, we would be right to regard such "acceptance" with extreme suspicion as scientists and distaste as human relations workers.

Or take the evidence presented in The American Soldier (38) of the more favorable attitudes towards Negro soldiers shown by white soldiers who had fought alongside Negro troops. Here the common objective is of course obvious. But just what is the meaning of "equal status" in a citizen army? The army is, to be sure, a great leveler; but what about the many "back home" status differences - should we assume that the common objective had made those disappear?

My guess is that the formulation of the conditions favorable to contact is somewhat more complex. It should take the form of a statement specifying the product of contact as a resultant of two or more forces. We might assay some hypothesis such as this: "When two groups of people interact in a situation involving a mutually desirable objective, such interaction will result in reduction of prejudice and intergroup tension, if the force of the drive toward attainment of their common goal is greater than the force or forces tending to perpetuate hostility. These latter could be unequal status, competitive goals, incompatible norms or value systems. The extent of reduction in tension or hostility will vary with the relative strength of the opposing forces".

It is easy to see how the example just given of combat troops could be made to fit the framework of this hypothesis. The sequel to the Sherif camping study may also be seen as conforming to this scheme. There, after initial hostilities between groups had been set in motion, an attempt was made to reduce tensions by having both groups participate as teammates in a game pitting the entire camp against another "outgroup". It was only partially successful, however, since some boys had apparently developed such hostility that the relatively short "peace" period was not long enough to make them change.

It seems to me that reformulation of the problem along these lines would have several advantages. For the researcher, this approach would ensure his taking experimental notice of the many variables which influence his results. It suggests the framework for objective measurement of these variables and also permits easier formulation of sub-hypotheses in quantitative terms suitable to experimental procedures. Moreover, in any practical situation it compels us to take notice of all the forces at work in a given interaction situation. Such awareness should enable us to foresee and provide against anticipated difficulties.

CONCLUSION

It would probably leave all of us with a comfortable feeling of having achieved a desired goal, if I could now summarize all of the previous findings in a few well-chosen sentences. Or, better still, transform them into a few maxims or guides to action. Regrettably it can't be done - not just yet. Perhaps if we ever do reach the point at which we, like Anatole France's wise men, can sum up human experience in half a dozen words, it will be just as unnecessary for us to do so.

For the moment, however, all of us, practitioners and researchers, are still some distance from complacency. But I think it must also be said that in the really incredibly short space of time during which we have begun to apply science to human relations problems, we have come a long way. There is a growing body of research which has significant things to say about many of the assumptions made in our work, and upon which both social scientist and practitioner can draw. There is greatly heightened awareness of the vital need for scientific appraisal and testing of effectiveness of methods whether new or old. And what is even more important, there is increased appreciation of the complexity of the phenomena with which we deal, both among researchers and practitioners. With this has come a growing reluctance to generalize on the basis of limited observation. It is this demonstration of complexity as well as the need for a continuing process of self-examination and questioning of old assumptions which, to my mind, constitute the really significant contributions which research has so far made. To realize that we have to do with complex problems is no small achievement. Without it we could not have hoped to progress much beyond the old trial and error methods. The steps before us now are the identification and isolation of the many variables, which determine the course of interaction between individuals and groups, and the perfection of even more effective techniques for utilizing those elements in the social and personal situation which facilitate change, and coping with those which stand in our way.

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THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM

TO: John Slawson

Nov 3, 1953

FROM: Marc Vosk *MV*

SUBJECT: Nationwide Polls

In November, 1950, the Scientific Department conducted a nationwide poll to determine general attitudes of the American people towards Jews and, in particular, the extent of association in the public mind of Jews with Communism and espionage. In general the results obtained were reassuring. The poll revealed substantial improvement in the general attitudes of the American people towards Jews since the last previous survey, completed in 1946. We found too a minimal association of Jews with Communists and of Jews with atomic espionage.

Some months later, in April, 1951, we again polled the nation, repeating a number of the questions asked in 1950. At that time, we reported an increase, slight and not statistically significant, in the spy-stereotype. The Communist stereotype had remained virtually unchanged.

The present poll was undertaken with similar objectives in view. It took place during the two weeks July 6th to 18th, 1953, within two to three weeks following the execution of the Rosenbergs, when the attendant widespread publicity was still at a high point.

On this occasion we augmented our usual national sample (about 1,300 interviews) by polling an additional 200 respondents in the state of Texas, in the light of a series of disturbing trends in the Southwest, including increased activity of various borderline anti-Semitic and subversive groups.

In most respects the results obtained in the July, 1953, poll confirm and support the favorable findings made in 1950. One important exception must be noted: This is the rise in criticism of Jews as spies and saboteurs. A significantly greater number of our respondents now report having heard such accusations.

Except for this marked increase in one kind of criticism reported, the total picture of American attitudes towards Jews remains an encouraging one.

A good single indicator of improvement in the general atmosphere is our social distance question, which was asked in 1950 and again in 1953:

"Suppose a Jewish family were going to move in next door to you. Would you say you wouldn't like that at all, or that you wouldn't like it but it wouldn't matter too much, or that it wouldn't make any difference to you?"

80% of our respondents, as compared with 69% in 1950, said "it would make no difference" to them.

Equally encouraging were the responses obtained to our trend question about groups "that are a threat to America". The question was put in this form:

"In your opinion, are there any nationality, religious, or racial groups in this country that are a threat to America? (IF 'Yes'): Which? Any others?"

This question has been used as a trend indicator for a number of years. Only 3% of white Christian respondents (2% of the total sample) mentioned Jews in 1953, compared with 5% in 1950. In 1946, when the same question was asked on a nationwide poll, 18% of the total sample listed Jews as a potentially threatening group.

We turn now to the kinds of criticism voiced by Gentiles against Jews. Here again it should be emphasized that - with the major exception of the "spy" stereotype - there has been a general decline in the amount of "talk heard".

As in our 1950 poll, we asked:

"Have you heard any criticism or talk against the Jews in the last six months?"

Only 21% of our sample, as compared with 24% in 1950 and 64% in 1946 reported having heard any criticism.

There was, however, one notable change in the nature of the criticism reported or heard. This was the marked growth in the "spy" or "traitor" accusation in the three-year period which has elapsed since our last poll.

As in previous years, our general question was followed by the more specific:

"What kind of criticism was it?"

This time, 19% of those who had heard criticism - or 4% of our total sample (one in five respondents) - said they had heard talk about "Jews as spies or traitors" or "about the Rosenbergs". This compares with 3% of those reporting criticism, or six-tenths of one per cent of all respondents, in 1950.

To determine the association of Jews and Communists in the public mind, we asked:

"Can you think of any kinds or groups of people in the United States who are more likely than others to be Communists? (IF 'Yes'): Which? Any others?"

Only 2% mentioned Jews in 1953, as compared with 4% who did so in 1950. Somewhat similar reductions, though not so great proportionately, were recorded for several other groups mentioned.

We next handed our respondents a card listing 14 different groups including Jews, and asked them to select those they thought more likely to be Communists. As expected, this procedure resulted in a higher number choosing Jews than on the previous question. However, the proportion was again lower than in 1950, 9% as compared with 11%.

Our findings on the Texas poll may be summarized in a single sentence -- By and large, Texan attitudes towards Jews are little different from those of other Americans and, for the time being at least, no undue cause for alarm exists.

MUemo

CC: Fred Robin

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
DEPARTMENT OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

REPORT ON THE NATIONWIDE POLL, JULY 1953

December, 1953

CONFIDENTIAL
NOT FOR RELEASE

BACKGROUND OF POLL

In November, 1950 the Scientific Department conducted a nationwide poll to determine general attitudes of the American people towards Jews and in particular, the extent of association in the public mind of Jews with Communism and espionage. The results obtained were reassuring. The poll revealed substantial improvement in the general attitudes of the American people towards Jews since the last previous survey completed in 1946. We found too a minimal association of Jews with Communists and of Jews with atomic espionage.

Some months later, in April 1951, we again polled the nation, repeating a number of the questions asked in 1950. At that time, we reported an increase, slight and not statistically significant, in the spy-stereotype. The Communist stereotype had remained virtually unchanged.

The present poll was undertaken with similar objectives in view. It took place during the two weeks - July 6th to 18th, 1953. These dates are particularly significant, because interviewing took place within two to three weeks following the execution of the Rosenbergs when the attendant widespread publicity was still at a high point.

On this occasion we augmented our usual national sample (about 1,300 interviews) by polling an additional 200 respondents in the State of Texas. This region was singled out for special study in the light of a series of

12/1/53

Dept. of Scientific Research

disturbing trends in the Southwest, including increased activity of various borderline anti-Semitic and subversive groups.

The issues covered by our survey, as well as the questions themselves, were formulated with the aid of a special staff committee representing other departments of the American Jewish Committee. In the pretesting of the questions and their final wording we were assisted by the National Opinion Research Center of Chicago which also carried out the nationwide field interviewing.

IMPROVEMENT IN GENERAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS

In most respects the results obtained in the August, 1953 poll confirm and support the favorable findings made in 1950. One important exception must be noted. This is the rise in criticism of Jews as spies and saboteurs. A significantly greater number of our respondents now report having heard such accusations.

Except for this marked increase in one kind of criticism reported, an increase which must be evaluated in terms of the proximity in time of our interviews to the execution of the Rosenbergs, the total picture of American attitudes towards Jews remains an encouraging one.

JEWS AS NEIGHBORS

A good single indicator of improvement in the general atmosphere is our social distance question which was asked in 1950 and again

in 1953:

"Suppose a Jewish family were going to move in next door to you. Would you say you wouldn't like that at all, or that you wouldn't like it but it wouldn't matter too much, or that it wouldn't make any difference to you?"

Eighty percent of our respondents said "it would make no difference to them", compared with 69% who gave this reply in 1950. Conversely only seven percent said "they wouldn't like it" as against ten percent in the earlier poll. (Table I, Appendix B).

Both Catholic and Protestant groups appear to have changed for the better. As in 1950, Catholics express less desire to discriminate. Nine out of ten as compared with three out of four Protestant respondents, reply that it would "make no difference" to them.

WHOM CAN
YOU TRUST

There were other responses indicating general betterment in attitude towards Jews. To one of our questions,

"In time of danger to America, would you say we can count on all Americans or are there some groups that cannot be trusted as much as others?"

we received replies indicating that Jews were at the bottom of the list of groups whom our respondents termed untrustworthy. In all, 63% of our sample said there were groups "you could not trust", while 32% said "you could count on all". (Table II, Appendix B).

Those who replied "can't trust some" were then asked to specify the groups they meant. Only one percent of this group spontaneously mentioned Jews. That is, only six tenths of one percent of our total sample said that Jews could not be trusted in times of danger. This figure is especially significant when taken in conjunction with the increase in the amount of criticism of Jews as spies (see page 5). It would appear, at least for the present, that despite the fact that one in 25 Americans had heard some talk about Jews as spies, or the Rosenbergs as Jews (see Table VI) only one in 160 Americans mentioned Jews among the groups one couldn't rely on in times of danger. Nevertheless, this comforting gap between hearing talk, and actual mistrust will bear watching, perhaps by means of future periodic

polls.

The probe on this question was of the "open-end" kind. It called for spontaneous reaction on the part of the interviewee and as such could be expected to elicit a minimum of anti-Jewish responses. Quite evidently though, Jews were far from uppermost ever in the mind of the "untrusting" respondent.

As might be expected "Communists and subversives" headed the list of untrustworthy groups, being mentioned by 59% of those who said there were groups "you couldn't trust". Foreigners and miscellaneous nationality groups were listed by eleven percent (Table III, Appendix B).

WHAT GROUPS THREATEN AMERICA

Equally encouraging were the responses obtained to our trend question about groups "that are a threat to

America". The question was put in this form:

"In your opinion are there any nationality, religious or racial groups in this country that are a threat to America?
(If yes) Which? Any others?"

This question has been used as a trend indicator for a number of years. In 1953, only three percent of White Christian respondents (two percent of the total sample) mentioned Jews, compared with five percent in 1950. In 1946 when the same question was asked on a nationwide poll, 18% of the total sample listed Jews as a potentially threatening group. Moreover, Jews as a group, appear to have made greater progress than either the Catholics or Negroes, in becoming less of "a threat to America" in the minds of some members of the American public. (Table IV., Appendix B).

CRITICISM OF JEWS

We turn now to the kinds of criticism voiced by Gentiles against Jews. We found - with the major exception of the "spy" stereotype - that there had been a general decline in the amount of "talk heard".

As in our 1950 poll, we asked:

"Have you heard any criticism or talk against the Jews
in the last six months?"

Only 21% of our sample (one out of five respondents) reported having heard any criticism or talk against Jews. This compares with 24% in 1950 and 64% in 1946. (Table V, Appendix B).

Here again is confirmation of our 1950 finding that talk and criticism against Jews dropped remarkably in the course of the past five or six years. The trend shown is consistent with the sharp decline in the number of respondents who see Jews as "a threat to America" (Table IV, Appendix B).

THE "SPY"
ACCUSATION

We have in previous reports commented on the persistence of commonly held stereotypes and often-heard criticism of the Jew. Some of these, particularly the economic power-unscrupulous business constellation, although, like all other accusations, now heard much less frequently, have remained at the head of the list of reported criticisms for many years.

There was, however, one notable change in the nature of the criticism reported or heard. This was the marked growth in the "spy" or "traitor" accusation in the three-year period which has elapsed since our last poll. A stereotype which was non-existent in 1946 had become in 1953 as current as the previously more frequent criticisms of Jewish business dealings and economic power.

As in previous years, our general question was followed by the more specific,

"What kind of criticism was it?"

Nineteen percent of those respondents who had reported criticism of Jews, that is four percent of our total sample (19% of 21%) indicated that such criticism had included remarks about Jews as spies, traitors or mention

of the Rosenbergs. That is, one person in twenty-five reported talk of this nature. In 1950, of the 24% who had reported talk critical of the Jews, only three percent - or six tenths of one percent of the total population - said that Jews had been called spies. In our subsequent April 1951, polling of the nation, the six tenths of one percent ratio had risen to 1.9%. The present jump to four percent should therefore be regarded as a small but probably significant increase in the prevalence of this kind of talk. (Table VI, Appendix B).

However, this statement needs some qualification:

1. A substantial majority (62%) of all respondents who said they had heard talk characterizing Jews as spies or mentioning the Rosenbergs, were Easterners. Since only 28% of our total sample was drawn from the East, this proportion assumes particular significance. It may be linked either to a greater public interest in, or to greater publicity surrounding, the Rosenberg execution in this part of the nation.
2. Such talk seems to be much more prevalent in Catholic than in Protestant circles. While only 14% of all Protestants who said they had heard criticism of Jews also said Jews had been called spies or traitors, 30% of the Catholics who had heard criticism said it was of this nature.

JEWS AND COMMUNISM

One of our major objectives in undertaking the present poll as well as its predecessors in 1950 and 1951 was to determine the frequency with which American Gentiles thought of American Jews as Communists. Our results in all three polls have consistently indicated a minimal association of this kind in the public mind.

In order that we may better appreciate the specific findings bearing out this statement, it is necessary to see them in the broader perspective of American attitudes towards Communism in general. We need to know not

only how American Gentiles regard Jews vis-a-vis Communists, but also what they think of Communists and how they see Communism in relation to other problems facing the United States. Our poll, therefore, included a number of questions designed to give us this larger frame of reference.

To form a judgment as to the degree of importance Americans attach to Communism, here and abroad, we asked first:

"What do you think are the greatest dangers facing the United States at the present time?"

It is clear from the replies we received that war and the threat of war remain the principal dangers in American minds, with Russia and the spread of Communism abroad taking second place both in 1950 and 1953. 43% of our respondents gave "war" as the principal danger, and 28% listed "Russia, world Communism" as compared with 38% and 29% respectively who gave these replies in 1950. "U.S. Communism and subversives" were given by 11 percent of our respondents in 1953 and 16 percent in 1950. "Economic conditions and the future" were mentioned by 16% in 1953 as against 11 percent in 1950. The atom bomb drew 12 percent of all replies given as compared with seven percent in 1950. (Table VII, Appendix B).

Since this question was open-ended and elicited only undirected replies, we followed it with a more specific query:

"At present, how great a danger do you feel American Communists are to this country -- a great danger, some danger but not too great, or practically no danger?"

We found that there had been a downward shift in people's appraisal of the extent of the danger from American Communists. In 1950, 46% regarded them as a great danger and 36% as "some, but not too great" a danger. In 1953, these proportions have changed places with 35% answering "great danger" and 44% "some, but not too great". At the same time, the number of people who

consider American Communists "practically no danger" rose from 12% in 1950 to 17% in 1953 (Table VIII, Appendix B).

Some interesting changes have taken place in the reasons given by people for regarding Communists as dangerous. We asked those who had replied either "great" or "some",

"In what way do you feel they are a danger?"

Replies indicated a rise (from 21% in 1950 to 37% in 1953) in the number of people who thought Communists a danger because "they spy or sabotage". This was paralleled by a corresponding drop in the proportion of respondents who gave as their reasons "they want to take over government, they are against democracy" (36% in 1950 as against 19% in 1953).

In the other categories mentioned, two minor but interesting changes may be noted. Although slightly fewer people in 1953 charge "Communists in government", a significantly greater number now feel they are "getting into the schools". The change may reflect a recent shift to attacks upon the schools rather than government by mushrooming borderline groups, or simply increased emphasis in newspapers and on the radio upon Congressional investigations of Communists in the schools and colleges. (Table IX, Appendix B).

The diminished importance of the "danger of American Communists" in the public mind is borne out also by the kinds of solutions favored in 1953 and in 1950. Replies to our question,

"Do you think anything should be done about American Communists at the present time? (If 'yes'): What do you think should be done about them?"

indicate a trend toward more orderly forms of dealing with the problem. 28% of our respondents now give deportation, jailing and other drastic solutions as against 35% in 1950. Somewhat greater numbers, 12% in 1953 as compared

with seven percent in 1950, say "do nothing to them" (Table X, Appendix B)

INVESTIGATING It is partly in this context that we must evaluate the replies
COMMITTEES we obtained to our next question in this same series:

"As you probably know, there are committees of Congress, like Senator McCarthy's, that are investigating Communism in the United States. Taking everything into consideration, do you feel that these committees do more good than harm, or more harm than good?"

Nearly two-thirds of our respondents (64%) thought the committees did "more good than harm" while one in six felt they did "more harm than good". Twenty percent either could not make up their minds or "didn't know" (Table XI, Appendix B).

Among those who thought Congressional investigating committees have done more GOOD than harm the two principle reasons for approval given can be categorized in these terms:

1. They are exposing Communists, disclosing their activities . . . 28% of respondents (26% Protestants, 30% Catholics) indicating approval for the committees gave this reason for their favorable attitude.
2. They alert the public, educate people on the dangers . . . 25% of respondents who approved the committee gave these reasons (25% Protestants, 25% Catholics).

Two additional categories, "they are investigating, getting the truth, turning up facts" and "they scare the Communists, make them reduce their activities", drew respectively 13% and 10% of the replies.

Those respondents who thought Congressional investigating committees had done more HARM than good also gave a variety of reasons. Some of these can hardly be classified as "liberal" opposition. They include statements such as "the committees were a waste of money, just seeking publicity, political

gain, etc." 27% of those respondents who disapproved of the Congressional investigating committees did so for these reasons (25% Protestants, 35% Catholics).

An equal proportion, 27% (27% Protestants, 25% Catholics) disapproved because "they smear innocent people, make unfounded charges". Only 12% (10% Protestants, 15% Catholics) gave as their reason the fact that the committees "make people afraid, foster distrust, disunity and suspicion", while eight percent added that their methods are "undisciplined, or totalitarian" (10% Protestants, three percent Catholics).

ASSOCIATION OF JEWS & COMMUNISTS

This then is the larger framework within which our questions specifically aimed at the association between Jews and Communists were put to our respondents. As in 1950, we began this portion of our inquiry by asking a completely open question:

"Can you think of any kinds or groups of people in the United States who are more likely than others to be Communists? (If yes) Which? Any others?"

Only two percent mentioned Jews in 1953 as compared with four percent who did so in 1950. Somewhat similar reductions, though not so great proportionately, were recorded for several other groups mentioned. (Table XII, Appendix B).

We next handed our respondents a card listing fourteen different groups including Jews, and asked them to select those they thought more likely to be Communists. As expected this procedure resulted in a higher number choosing Jews than on the previous question. However, the proportion was again lower than in 1950, nine percent as compared with 11%.

In all, seven groups received more, five less choices than did Jews. As in 1950, labor union members were chosen most frequently (25%) with actors (16%) poor people (15%) and "people in government in Washington"

(15%) following in that order.

It is noteworthy that a considerably larger proportion of respondents (31%) in 1953 thought that "none of the groups" could be said to be "more likely to be Communist". As a matter of fact only three groups were more frequently mentioned in 1953 than in 1950; actors, teachers and Catholics. (Table XIII, Appendix B). However the increases registered were slight and hardly significant statistically.

Also bearing on the extent of association of Jews and Communists is the evidence furnished by our "criticism" question. It will be recalled that 21% of those queried had heard "talk or criticism" (Table V). Of this 21%, seven percent (Table VI) went on to say that Jews had been called "Communists". Thus about 1.4% of the total sample reported association of this kind. This represents a slight increase over 1950, when 1.2% of our sample told of hearing similar criticism, but so small as to be almost without significance statistically.

SUMMARY

To recapitulate briefly, in all respects save one, the present poll appears to indicate improved attitudes on the part of white Christian Americans towards Jews. Association of Jews with Communism continues minimal. In one important area, that of espionage and treason, there has been increasing criticism of Jews voiced. For the present, these accusations do not seem to have affected the generally favorable picture nor have they induced mistrust of Jews as a group. There is moreover some ground for regarding this marked growth in talk about Jews as spies, as linked to the publicity surrounding the Rosenberg case. There is some reason to believe that when and if this publicity subsides, accusations of this kind will also diminish. Undoubtedly however this association must continue to be watched carefully, probably through the medium of repeated polls.

TEXAS

This region, as we indicated previously, was singled out for special study in our July, 1953 poll. Our major findings can be summarized briefly; details will be found in the tables in Appendix B.

Texans regard Jews much as do their fellow-Americans. Their attitudes even appear to be slightly less negative than those of the nation as a whole. If for example we compare the replies given to our social distance question, we find Texans to be at least as accepting of Jewish neighbors as other Americans. Somewhat fewer Texans (five percent as against seven percent nationally) say they are definitely opposed to having Jewish neighbors. Substantially equal percentages nationally and in Texas state either that "it wouldn't matter too much" or that "it would make no difference at all" (Table I, Appendix B).

A similar picture of "tolerance" is afforded by the answers to our question about "groups one can trust". We found that although more Texans appear to distrust "some groups", Jews were not even mentioned among those whom "we cannot trust". Significantly, more vague, irrelevant and general answers were given, while most of the specific groups named received fewer choices, proportionately, than they did in the national sample. It may be conjectured that the existence of this rather large body of non-specific "distrust" could well ease the future task of organizations seeking to mobilize hostility against particular institutions, individuals or minority groups (Table II, Appendix B).

Whether or not most Texans would agree with one woman who told our interviewer, "we have no group problems here, only racial ones", there actually is less criticism of Jews reported. There are, it is true, some differences in proportions of respondents who report one or another criticism, but these differences do not appear to be highly significant (Tables V and VI, Appendix B).

Just as in other sections of the country, a striking increase in the "spy" stereotype has occurred. Even so, the actual number of people who made this accusation (19% of the 15% who heard criticism) is still small, less than three percent of all Texan respondents. Of some interest too is the fact that both the "clannish" and the "money" stereotype seem to be more prevalent in Texas than in the rest of the nation.

In Texas, the stereotype of the Jew-as-Communist is even less frequently encountered than in the nation as a whole. Only one in a hundred Texans, as against two in one hundred other Americans, spontaneously mentioned Jews, when asked to think of groups "likely to be Communists". Even when presented with the card listing Jews among others only six percent, compared with nine percent nationally selected Jews (Tables XII, XIII, Appendix B).

It is clear that Jews appear to be at least as favorably regarded in Texas as in other parts of the United States. Do Texans also resemble their fellow citizens in their views on some of the major problems facing America? The evidence we have seems to point to a somewhat greater insularity, a tendency to focus more on internal than external dangers and a slightly higher degree of vague mistrust of other groups.

Only one in four Texan respondents said "We can count on all groups in time of danger", compared with one in three who replied similarly on the nationwide sample. Conversely 69% as against 63% said "you can't trust some".

Along the same lines, when asked:

"What do you think are the greatest dangers facing the United States at the present time?",

Texans tended to answer more in terms of immediately present threats than in terms of dangers from the outside. Thus, Russia, the spread of world Communism, the threat of atomic bombs, occupied them less than did economic

conditions or Communism at home. The Korean War with its direct involvement of American troops received the highest mention, half of all respondents listing it as a major danger (Table VII, Appendix B).

Also, perhaps because of their greater concern with "home" problems, Texans were slightly more prone to think American Communists a "great danger" than was the rest of the country and less willing to label American Communists "some but not too great a danger" (Table VIII, Appendix B).

On the subject of Congressional investigations of Communism, Texans divide on more or less the same lines as do other Americans. 59% of them, compared with 64% nationally, are prepared to say "taking everything into consideration these committees do more good than harm". Twelve percent, as against sixteen percent nationally, reply "more harm than good". Significantly more respondents in this region than in the nation as a whole, appear either to be on the fence or unable to make up their minds on this question, 29% against 20%.

How are we to evaluate the results of the Texas poll in terms of the disturbing events which made us choose this region for special study? Our survey seems to show a somewhat greater degree of insularity and preoccupation with domestic problems in Texas than is the case in other regions of the country. In general however, Texan opinion does not appear to differ much from attitudes of the nation as a whole. We may, if we wish, draw the inference from these facts that the activity of subversive groups has not yet been able to adversely affect this favorable climate. There is of course no assurance that continued or intensified attacks, especially if directed against Jews or Jewish groups, may not in time have such effects. In fact, our "trust" question gives some evidence of danger in this area. That general mistrust with which a good many Texans now regard vague, unspecified groups, may become canalized and directed at particular groups and individuals through the deliberate efforts of borderline or subversive organizations. Future surveys in this region should enable us to maintain an objective check on the progress of such tendencies.

APPENDIX A

RELIABILITY OF POLL FINDINGS

A word about the reliability of our findings. It should be noted that a sample of this size (1,300 cases) will reflect a "true" division of opinion, with at most a 3.6 percent margin of error in 99 cases out of 100. The outside limit of error (3.6 percent) can occur only when opinion is split evenly. That is, a figure reported as 50% will lie between 46% and 54% in 99 cases out of 100. Actually this is a conservative way of putting it; should opinion be split 80-20 the margin of error is further reduced.

It follows that small percentage point shifts in one direction or another should not be regarded as meaningful. Only when the change from one poll to another is greater than four or five percent, can we safely assume that actual shift in opinion has taken place.

Our sample of 200 cases in Texas reflects a "true" division of opinion within at most (when opinion is equally divided) an eight percent margin of error in 99 cases out of 100. The National Opinion Research Center assures us moreover that they have demonstrated the stability of a 200-case sample many times by analyzing the first 200 cases to come out of larger samples. Rarely did they find more than a few points shift in the final results. Even so, small percentage differences between the national and the Texas samples should not be interpreted too rigidly, and proper allowance should be made for the theoretically possible margin of error.

TABIE I**

"Suppose a Jewish family were going to move in next door to you. Would you say you wouldn't like that at all, or that you wouldn't like it but it wouldn't matter too much, or that it wouldn't make any difference to you?"

	<u>1 9 5 0</u>			<u>1 9 5 3</u>			
	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>TWC*</u>	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>TWC*</u>	<u>Texas</u>
Wouldn't like	12%	6%	10%	8%	4%	7%	5%
Not matter too much	23	12	20	15	5	12	13
No difference	64	81	69	76	90	80	79
Don't know	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

*Total White Christians.

**This table and all subsequent tables in this report show proportion of respondents giving indicated replies in percentages of the sample queried in each instance.

TABLE II

"In time of danger to America, would you say we can count on all Americans, or are there some groups that cannot be trusted as much as others?"

	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>TWC</u>	<u>Texas</u>
Can count on all groups	30%	36%	32%	24%
Can't trust some	66	58	63	69
Don't know	4	6	5	7

TABLE III

"(IF 'can't trust some'): Which groups do you think we could not entirely trust?"

	<u>Percent of those answering question</u>		<u>Percent of total sample</u>	
	<u>TWC</u>	<u>Texas</u>	<u>TWC</u>	<u>Texas</u>
Communists, subversives	59%	41%	35%	27%
Foreigners, nationality groups	11	7	7	4
Labor unions, labor groups	5	3	3	2
Pacifists	5	7	3	4
Jews	1	—	*	—
Others, miscellaneous	15	9	10	5
Some in all groups	9	12	6	7
Don't know	14	28	10	20

*Less than one percent.

TABLE IV

"In your opinion, are there any nationality, religious or racial groups in this country that are a threat to America? (IF 'Yes'): Which? Any others?"

	<u>1946 Total</u>	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>1 9 5 0 Cath.</u>	<u>TWC</u>	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>1 9 5 3 TWC*</u>	<u>Total**</u>	<u>Texas</u>
Jews	18%	5%	5%	5%	3%	1%	3%	2%	2%
Catholics	7	8	—	6	6	—	4	4	7
Negroes	13	7	4	6	5	1	4	4	5

*Total White Christians, not strictly comparable to 1946 percentages which are available for the sample as a whole.

**Total including Negroes, given for comparison with 1946.

TABLE V

"Have you heard any criticism or talk against the Jews in the last six months?"

	<u>1946</u>	<u>1 9 5 0</u>			<u>1 9 5 3</u>			<u>Total**</u>	<u>Texas</u>
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>TWC</u>	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>TWC*</u>		
Have heard	64%	26%	19%	24%	20%	21%	21%	21%	15%
Have not heard	34	74	81	76	80	79	79	79	85
No answer	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

See previous page

TABLE VI

"(IF 'YES') : What kind of criticism was it?"

Percent of those answering "Yes"

Percent of total sample

	<u>1946</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>Texas</u>		<u>1946</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>Texas</u>	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>TWC</u>	<u>TWC</u>	<u>Total</u>		<u>Total</u>	<u>TWC</u>	<u>TWC*</u>	<u>Total*</u>	
Too much business power	17%	16%	21%	20%	23%	11%	4%	14%	4%	3%
Spies, traitors, reference to Rosenbergs	--	3	19	20	19	--	6	4	4	3
Unscrupulous, greedy	11	39	24	19	16	7	9	4	4	2
Rich, too much money	--	14	8	7	13	--	3	2	1	2
Too much political power	6	5	5	5	3	4	1	1	1	.5
Communists	1	5	7	6	6	.6	1	1.4	1.2	1
Aggressive, pushy	6	11	16	5	--	4	3	1	1	--
Clannish, stick together	3	4	4	4	10	2	1	1	1	2

*Total White Christians, not strictly comparable to 1946.

**Total includes Negroes, comparable to 1946.

TABLE VII

"What do you think are the greatest dangers facing the United States at the present time?"

	<u>1 9 5 0</u>			<u>1 9 5 3</u>			<u>Texas</u>
	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>TWC</u>	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>TWC</u>	
War, threat of war	39%	36%	38%	42%	47%	43%	50%
Russia, world Communism	30	28	29	28	28	28	10
Economic conditions, future	11	12	11	16	15	16	16
Atom bomb	7	8	7	10	17	12	8
U. S. Communism, subversives	16	19	17	11	8	11	14
Moral, character weakness	3	1	2	9	3	7	8
Politics, corruption	5	2	5	5	4	4	4

TABLE VIII

"At present, how great a danger do you feel American Communists are to this country -- a great danger, some danger but not too great, or practically no danger?"

	<u>1 9 5 0</u>			<u>1 9 5 3</u>			
	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>TWC</u>	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>TWC</u>	<u>Texas</u>
Great danger	45%	48%	46%	36%	33%	35%	37%
Some danger, but not great	36	35	36	43	46	44	39
Practically no danger	12	11	12	17	17	17	16
Don't know	7	6	6	4	4	4	8

TABLE IX

"(IF 'Great' or 'Some' danger): In what way do you feel they are a danger?"

	Percent of those answering <u>"Great or Some"</u>			Percent of total <u>sample</u>		
	<u>1950</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>Texas</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>Texas</u>
They spy, sabotage	21%	37%	30%	16%	29%	23%
They influence people	14	17	17	11	13	13
They get into government	9	7	10	7	6	8
They get into schools	2	9	11	2	7	8
They want to take over govern- ment, against democracy (genl.)	36	19	9	30	16	7
They are secret, under cover	7	8	8	6	6	6
Don't know	13	9	13	11	7	10

TABLE X

"Do you think anything should be done about American Communists at the present time?
(IF 'Yes'): What do you think should be done about them?"

	<u>1 9 5 0</u>			<u>1 9 5 3</u>			<u>Texas</u>
	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>TWC</u>	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>TWC</u>	
Deport, jail, execute	36%	35%	35%	26%	35%	28%	33%
Restrictions	6	6	6	8	8	8	8
Continue present measures	7	7	7	10	8	9	5
Watched, registered	21	23	21	24	21	23	12
Enforce law, convict them*	3	5	4	11	7	10	12
Do nothing	7	5	7	12	13	12	8
Don't know	17	19	18	8	7	8	14

TABLE XI

"As you probably know, there are committees of Congress, like Senator McCarthy's, that are investigating Communism in the United States. Taking everything into consideration, do you feel that these committees do more good than harm, or more harm than good?"

	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>TWC</u>	<u>Texas</u>
More good than harm	63%	69%	64%	59%
More harm than good	17	13	16	12
Don't know	20	18	20	29

*Answers in this category are not strictly comparable for the two polls. In 1950, the emphasis of respondents was upon "enforcement of adequate existing laws", whereas in 1953 it appears to be upon "strict enforcement and conviction".

TABLE XII

"Can you think of any kinds or groups of people in the United States who are more likely than others to be Communists? (IF 'Yes'): Which? Any others?"

	<u>1 9 5 0</u>			<u>1 9 5 3</u>			
	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>TWC</u>	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>TWC</u>	<u>Texas</u>
Poor people	16%	9%	14%	10%	5%	10%	5%
Foreigners, aliens	15	7	13	9	4	7	7
Labor union people	5	7	6	7	3	6	3
Intellectuals, educated	4	--	--	6	5	6	3
Miscellaneous nationalities	7	6	7	5	3	4	4
Ignorant, uneducated	7	4	6	4	4	4	3
Negroes	4	1	3	5	2	4	4
Jews	4	4	4	2	3	2	1
Frustrated, unhappy people	1	4	2	2	2	2	--
Miscellaneous	12	15	13	13	10	12	5
No, none, all kinds, don't know	48	58	52	55	72	60	70

TABLE XIII

"In this country, do you think any of the people listed here are more likely to be Communists than others?" (Hand respondent card.)

	<u>1 9 5 0</u>			<u>1 9 5 3</u>			<u>Texas</u>
	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>TWC</u>	<u>Prot.</u>	<u>Cath.</u>	<u>TWC</u>	
Labor union members	31%	26%	30%	27%	21%	25%	16%
Actors	13	11	12	17	15	16	12
Poor people	23	15	21	15	15	15	11
People in government in Washington	21	15	20	16	14	15	17
Negroes	16	9	14	12	13	12	13
Teachers	8	8	8	10	10	10	8
College students	14	11	13	10	10	10	7
Americans of Italian descent	12	3	9	10	5	9	8
Jews	11	9	11	9	10	9	6
Puerto Ricans in U. S.	26	24	25	7	6	6	9
New Yorkers	14	6	11	6	4	6	5
Americans of Polish descent	8	5	7	6	3	5	4
Catholics	3	--	2	4	1	3	6
Protestants	--	1	--	--	1	--	--
No, none of them	16	26	18	28	37	31	20
Don't know	17	18	17	12	13	12	30

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AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM

To: David Danzig

January 21, 1953

From: Marc Vosk *MV*

Subject: Proposal for national poll.

1. January 20, 1953 saw the installation for the first time in twenty years of a Republican administration in Washington. Most political commentators agree that this event presages important changes in American policy orientation here and abroad during the next four or more years. The nature of these changes and their effect upon the position of Jews in the United States are matters of vital concern to the American Jewish Committee.

2. In a number of problem areas with which the American Jewish Committee is concerned, we had reached a "stock taking" point even before the outcome of the election was known. The Staff Policy Committee has had before it many problems relating to the political future and its effect upon Jews in the United States, Church-State, Communism and war, Civil rights and Civil liberties, and others of like moment. Many of its deliberations have been hampered by the lack of relevant and necessary facts. The kinds of information needed varied all the way from historical background fill-ins, to knowledge of how the American public felt about such specific issues as released time.

Here, we are concerned with one phase of the total picture, that is with national public opinion and attitudes towards these problems. Other studies, historical, sociological and psychological may be required to complete the guide needed for effective programming. Listed below are a number of questions which have troubled us to which for the present, we have no definite answers.

1. What were the reasons which impelled the voters of the United States to change over from a democratic to a republican administration.
2. To what extent does their action reflect a desire for increased conservatism or even reaction in government? Or is it merely a desire for "change"?
3. What are the present attitudes of the American public towards Korea, cold-war, Communism and the Jews, espionage, etc.?

4. Has there been any increasing association in the public mind of Jews with communism or espionage? Has the Rosenberg case had any effect upon attitudes towards Jews?
5. What have been the effects if any, of our campaign to bring before the American public the facts about anti-Semitism in Eastern European countries? Reinforce popularly held stereotypes of the Jew as alien, internationalist, communist, untrustworthy? Revive accusation of Jews "getting others to pull their chestnuts out of fires"? As warmongers? Interested only in their own people?

We have been concerned for some time by the public relations position of the Jews on the questions of church-state. We should like to know for example:

1. To what extent is the American public "sold" on released or dismissed time for school children? Is Jewish opposition to released time regarded unfavorably?
2. How does the American public regard the broad questions of church-state relationships?
3. Has there been a change in traditional American opposition to church influence in public affairs?
4. To what extent do the American people support government aid to parochial institutions, education, welfare, etc.?
5. Is there any measurable trend towards increasing religiosity?

Similarly, our work in the general field of public education would be well served by the answers to a number of questions which have been troubling us. Among them are:

1. What do American people think about their schools?
2. Has the attack upon the "secularism" of the American schools taken hold?
3. Have the attacks upon progressive education been successful?
4. What do the people think about parochial schools?
5. Is there any opposition, and how great is it, to the introduction of religion in the public schools; to bible reading, prayer, etc.?

In the area of Civil rights and Civil liberties our programming could be helped by answers to the following questions among others:

1. Is the issue of Civil rights and Civil liberties an important one for American people?
2. To what extent do the American people feel that problems of security justify denial or limitation of Civil rights or Civil liberties for certain groups in the population.
3. To what fields should security checks and loyalty investigations be extended, if any. Are there any fields where such checks are not necessary? In government? Industry? The entertainment field?
4. What safeguards against violation of citizen rights are seen as needed?

Insofar as Jews in particular are concerned, we want to know;

1. Has there been any change in the degree or pattern of anti-Jewish feeling in the United States since our last poll in 1950?
2. Are these changes, if any, related to national or international developments?
3. To what extent if any, do the last election results reflect such changes?
4. Do the American people expect or want any change in policy towards minority groups on the part of the present administration?

There are other problems which face the agency today on which a poll could throw some light. Some subtler manifestations of present day trends may also be tapped. For example, the following questions might have considerable bearing on our orientation in national affairs:

1. Has the tendency sometimes manifested to scapegoat Jews for national ills remained unchanged? Are Jews for example, blamed for increasing friction between Catholics and Protestants? Are Jews "responsible" for our international complications? Are they in fact "leading us into another war"?
2. If the present election represented a trend towards isolationism, and opposition to the "useless war" in Korea, does this sentiment represent an increasing degree of nationalism in the American people? (extremes of nationalism have always been associated with anti-minority feeling).

3. Do the American people feel that the government has gone far enough in "appeasing" minority groups with FEP legislation, etc.?

The above questions and many others of the like import seem to have critical importance in the shaping of our educational campaign during the next year or two. The answers we obtain should be of help in setting our goals and in establishing "channel markers" for future activities.

I would propose therefore, that the Department of Scientific Research undertake a national poll in the immediate future which would get us information of this nature. Financing the poll would require approximately \$10,000 (exclusive of staff time). This estimate is based on the costs of our last national poll on Communism.

mv:mr

cc: Dr. John Slawson